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PREVIEW; Park Cty. Envtl. Council and Greater Yellowstone 
Coal. v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality and Lucky Minerals, 
Inc.: MEPA and Review of Agency Decisions 
Lacey Fortin 
The Montana Supreme Court was originally set to hear oral 
argument on this matter on Thursday, April 30, 2020. However, 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court cancelled oral 
arguments and will decide the matter based on the parties’ briefs.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This case presents the following issues: 1) whether the 
plaintiffs-appellees have standing to challenge the Montana 
Department of Environmental Quality’s (DEQ) decision to issue 
Lucky Minerals an exploration license; 2) whether the DEQ 
violated the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) by failing 
to take the required “hard look” at the environmental impacts of 
Lucky Minerals’ proposed mining exploration; and 3) whether 
Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) (2019) violates plaintiff-
appellees’ constitutional rights to meaningful participation in 
agency decision-making and to a clean and healthful environment.  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In February 2015, Lucky Minerals, Inc. (Lucky Minerals) 
filed an application to conduct mining exploration on its property 
in the Emigrant Gulch Mining District of the Absaroka Mountains. 
The DEQ prepared a draft environmental assessment (EA), which 
was submitted for public review and a 60-day comment period 
beginning on October 12, 2016.1 The DEQ ultimately approved 
Lucky Minerals’ application, adopting an agency modified 
alternative which imposed some additional mitigation measures.2  
 
After issuance of the exploration license to Lucky 
Minerals, Park County Environmental Council and Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition (PCEC) filed a lawsuit in Park County 
District Court challenging the DEQ’s decision to grant the license.3 
 
1 Appellant’s (State of Montana) Opening Brief at 5, Park Cty. Envtl. 
Council v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/9HLH-DHVN 
(November 29, 2019) (No. 19-0492).   
2 Id.  
3 Appellant’s (Lucky Minerals) Opening Brief at 6, Park Cty. Envtl. Council 
v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/S2E9-B2J4 (November 29, 
2019) (No. 19-0492). 
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PCEC also moved to vacate Lucky Minerals’ exploration license.4 
The district court ruled that the DEQ violated MEPA by failing to 
take the required “hard look” at the environmental impacts of 
Lucky Minerals’ proposed plan, including the impacts on wildlife 
and water quality.5 The district court also granted PCEC’s motion 
to vacate the exploration license, holding the remedial measure 
limitations in Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) violated the 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to participation in agency decision-
making and to a clean and healthful environment.6  
 
Lucky Minerals and DEQ have appealed the district court’s 
rulings. The Office of the Attorney general has intervened on 
behalf of the State of Montana.  
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellants’ (DEQ, Lucky Minerals, and State of Montana) 
Arguments 
Lucky Minerals argues that PCEC does not have standing 
in this matter. Both Lucky Minerals and the DEQ argue that the 
district court erred in ruling that the DEQ’s environmental analysis 
was inadequate under MEPA. Lucky Minerals and the State of 
Montana also argue that the district court erroneously concluded 
that the statute requiring remand to the DEQ was unconstitutional.   
First, Lucky Minerals contends that PCEC failed to meet 
the requirements for standing to challenge the issuance of their 
exploration license. Because MEPA is barren of a provision 
conferring an express right of judicial review to private litigants, 
standing in MEPA actions is based upon prudential standards.7 
Therefore, a plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action requires the 
following: 1) a clear threat to a past, present or threatened injury to 
a property or civil right; 2) the alleged injury must be an actual 
“case or controversy”;8 and 3) the injury must be “concrete.”9  
 
Lucky Minerals argues that PCEC’s “vague allegations of 
non-specific injuries to biking, hiking, and skiing up Emigrant 
 
4 Id. at 7–8. 
5 Appellant’s (DEQ) Opening Brief at 13–14, Park Cty. Envtl. Council v. 
Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/C9KS-6ED5 (November 27, 
2019) (No. 19-0492).  
6 Appellant’s (DEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 5, at 8. 
7 Id. at 19.  
8 Schoof v. Nesbit, 316 P.3d 831, 835 (Mont. 2014). 
9 Schoof, 316 P.3d at 836.   
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Gulch” are insufficient to satisfy those requirements.10 In fact, they 
state that PCEC’s claimed standing is simply based on 
“speculation that legal injury could potentially be visited upon 
[them] at some unspecified point in the future as a result of [large-
scale] industrial mining activity.”11 As such, Lucky Minerals 
argues that PCEC’s complaint in the case below should have been 
dismissed for lack of standing.   
 
Second, the DEQ contends it took the required “hard look” 
at Lucky Minerals’ proposed plan. In doing so, they state they 
satisfied their obligation to “make an adequate compilation of 
relevant information, to analyze it reasonable, and to consider all 
pertinent data.”12 The DEQ disagrees with the district court’s 
finding that they “cherry picked”, or arbitrarily disregarded, 
pertinent water quality,13 and argues they were not required to 
consider the potential effects of a full-scale mining operation as a 
secondary impact of Lucky Minerals’ proposed plan.14 
Furthermore, because their final EA took a sufficiently “hard look” 
at the relevant data, they maintain no formal environmental impact 
(EIS) was required.  
 
Finally, the State of Montana argues that Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-201(6)(c) and (d) are constitutional, both facially and as 
applied to the facts of this case. The State of Montana notes that 
MEPA merely constitutes procedural guidelines designed to 
complement substantive regulatory environmental law in 
Montana.15 In contrast to regulatory laws, MEPA is “intended to 
inform the legislature and the public whether these substantive 
environmental protection laws are sufficient [to protect Montana’s 
environment].”16  
 
The State contends the district court erroneously 
determined MEPA itself should provide remedies to protect the 
environment.17 This, they maintain, is antithetical to the Court’s 
previously “restrained and targeted approach” of reviewing 
substantive environmental laws in isolation from MEPA.18 
Because PCEC only alleged injuries under MEPA—which does 
 
10 Appellant’s (Lucky Minerals) Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 22. 
11 Id. at 18.  
12 Appellant’s (DEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 5, at 12. 
13 Id. at 22.  
14 Id. at 34 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-335(1) (2019) requiring Lucky 
Minerals to get additional approval to conduct any future mining).  
15 Appellant’s (State of Montana) Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 16. 
16 Id. at 17 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-102(1) (2019)).  
17 Id. at 23.  
18 Id. at 25.  
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not provide injunctive relief—and PCEC also failed to allege 
injury under any substantive law, Lucky Minerals contends they 
are not entitled to relief.  
 
The State also asserts the district court’s ruling that the 
DEQ should have considered the potential impacts of an expansion 
into a full-scale mining operation violated the tiered decision-
making system of the Metal Mining Reclamation Act (MMRA). 
The State notes the MMRA would require Lucky Minerals to file a 
separate application before conducting full-scale mining. The State 
thus inherently argues the MMRA was the substantive regulatory 
law on which the district court should have relied in making its 
decision. 
 
B. Appellees’ (PCEC) Arguments 
 
Appellees argue that the district court’s decision should be 
affirmed in all respects. Specifically, they contend the district court 
was correct in determining they had standing to challenge the grant 
to Lucky Minerals of a mining exploration license, and that the 
DEQ arbitrarily failed to consider pertinent data on potential 
adverse environmental impacts. As such, PCEC contends the 
DEQ’s Final EA was flawed, and should have resulted in a finding 
of significant environmental impacts and called for an EIS. Finally, 
PCEC argues the remedial measure restrictions in Mont. Code 
Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) fail to satisfy strict scrutiny and are 
therefore unconstitutional both facially and as applied here.  
 
PCEC contends they have standing to challenge the DEQ’s 
approval of Lucky Mineral’s mining exploration license. 
Consistent with precedent, the individual plaintiffs filed affidavits 
in the district court alleging “injuries sufficient to confer standing 
by documenting harm to their business, property, recreational or 
aesthetic interests if the exploration project proceeds.”19 PCEC 
argues their injuries are sufficient to establish standing because, as 
nearby landowners and frequent recreationists in the Emigrant 
Gulch area, the proposed exploration project will be more harmful 
to them than the public generally.20  
 
PCEC also argues the DEQ violated MEPA by failing to 
take the requisite “hard look” at the pertinent information in its 
environmental assessment of Lucky Minerals’ proposed mining 
 
19 Plaintiffs-Appellees’ (PCEC) Response Brief at 14, Park Cty. Envtl. 
Council v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/HE62-RNCH 
(January 27, 2020) (No. 19-0492). 
20 Id. at 16.    
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exploration project. Specifically, PCEC contends the DEQ’s final 
EA was insufficient because it arbitrarily dismissed potential harm 
to wildlife and water quality, and it failed to properly evaluate 
feasible project alternatives that contemplated a reduced scale of 
Lucky Minerals’ exploration project.21 As a result, PCEC asserts 
that the DEQ erroneously determined no EIS was required and 
therefore improperly issued Lucky Minerals the exploration 
license.  
 
Specifically, PCEC contends information gaps, selective 
reliance on data, and a vague “plan to make a plan” to mitigate 
potential adverse environmental impacts constitute an arbitrary 
analysis.22 In PCEC’s view, these failings resulted in an analysis 
that should have found significant environmental impacts, which 
would have required an EIS pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-
201(1)(b)(iv) and Mont. Admin. R. 17.4.607.23 Additionally, 
PCEC asserts the DEQ violated MEPA by “failing to conduct an 
independent analysis” of alternative methods of meeting Lucky 
Minerals’ project goals and by failing to seriously consider how to 
reduce potential adverse environmental impacts.24  
 
Finally, PCEC argues the 2011 Legislature’s “prohibition 
against district courts’ vacating or enjoining of unlawful state 
agency decisions violates the public’s fundamental rights to be free 
from unreasonable environmental degradation, Mont Const. art. II, 
§ 3; art. IX, § 1, and participate in agency decision-making before 
final decisions are made, Mont. Const. art. II, § 8.”25 In other 
words, PCEC contends the restrictions on remedial measures 
provided in the statute infringe on their constitutional rights to a 
clean and healthful environment and to participate in agency 
decision-making.  
 
They argue that, because these provisions infringe on 
fundamental rights, they must satisfy strict scrutiny by being 
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.26 PCEC’s position 
is that, with respect to Lucky Minerals’ exploration permit, Mont. 
Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) are not narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest, and therefore do not pass strict scrutiny. 
 
21 Id. at 17–22.  
22 Id. at 27–28.  
23 Id. at 28.  
24 Plaintiffs-Appellees’ (PCEC) Response Brief, supra note 20, at 32 (citing 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 237 F.Supp.2d 48, 53 (D.C., 
2002), applying National Environmental Policy Act).  
25 Id. at 37.  
26 Id. at 51.  
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Thus, they assert the Supreme Court should affirm the district 
court’s ruling that the provision is unconstitutional.  
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Court will likely affirm the district court’s order that 
plaintiffs-appellees have standing to challenge Lucky Minerals’ 
exploration license based on alleged past, present, or threatened 
injury to property and business interests, as well as infringement 
on their constitutional rights.27 The individual plaintiffs include 
property owners, business owners, and frequent recreationists in 
the area.28 The Court has, in other instances, affirmed plaintiffs’ 
standing to challenge activities based on potential impacts to 
wildlife, noise and traffic, and property values.29 It is therefore 
likely the Court will agree with the district court that plaintiffs’ 
alleged injuries to property values, business operations, and 
recreational interests based on disturbance of wildlife, threats to 
water quality, and increased traffic and noise are sufficient to 
establish a “past, present, or threatened injury” to property rights 
that are “distinguishable from . . .  injury to the public generally.”30  
 
If the Court finds the plaintiffs-appellees have standing to 
challenge the DEQ’s decision to issue Lucky Minerals’ exploration 
license, it is likely to find the procedural limitations under Mont. 
Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) do not infringe on the 
constitutional right to participate in agency decision-making.  
 
The Montana Constitution guarantees citizens the right to 
“expect governmental agencies to afford such reasonable 
opportunity for citizen participation in the operation of the 
agencies prior to the final decision.”31 Here, the DEQ provided 
notice and opportunity to participate by submitting the proposal for 
public review and comment pursuant to this requirement.32 It 
appears the plaintiffs-appellees participated enthusiastically in this 
process.  
 
 
27 Id. at 14 (citing Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 230 P.3d 808 
(Mont. 2010) (subsequent citations omitted)).  
28 Id.  
29 Plaintiffs-Appellees’ (PCEC) Response Brief, supra note 19, at 14 (citing 
Aspen Trails Ranch, 230 P.3d 808; Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255 
P.3d 80 (Mont. 2011)).  
30 Id. at 12–13 (citing Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 92). 
31 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
32 Appellant’s (DEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 5, at 8.  
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However, regardless of whether PCEC actually participated 
in the DEQ’s original decision-making process, a claim for 
infringement of their right to participate is essentially rendered 
moot upon a court remanding the decision for reconsideration. 
Furthermore, any future violation by the agency of the plaintiffs-
appellees’ right to participate in the new decision-making process 
would be directly actionable under MEPA. In short, it seems 
improbable the Court would find the procedural limitations of the 
statute, alone, create an actionable injury to the constitutional right 
to participate. 
 
Finally, the Court will likely find that the district court 
erroneously determined the DEQ’s environmental analysis was 
insufficient and improperly voided Lucky Minerals’ exploration 
license in violation of the procedural limitations of Mont. Code 
Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d). As defendant-appellants Lucky 
Minerals point out, courts review agency actions under MEPA to 
determine whether the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or 
unlawfully.33 When courts review an executive agency’s 
interpretation of its own governing laws or regulations, substantial 
deference is paid to the agency’s decisions rendered pursuant to its 
own expertise “unless such interpretation is plainly inconsistent 
with the spirit of the regulation.”34 The Court will afford the DEQ 
the appropriate level of deference here. In doing so, it is likely to 
find the environmental analysis was sufficient to warrant the 
issuance of an exploration license to Lucky Minerals.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It is likely that the Court will affirm the district court’s 
order that PCEC has standing to challenge Lucky Minerals’ mining 
exploration permit based on concrete and personal alleged injuries. 
In doing so, the Court will likely find Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-
201(6)(c)–(d) do not unconstitutionally infringe on the right to 
participate in agency decision-making, and instead merely serve as 
a procedural complement to substantive regulatory laws. 
Furthermore, the Court will afford the DEQ deference on its 
environmental assessment and hold the analysis of potential 
environmental impacts was sufficient. As a result, the Court will 
likely reverse the district court’s order voiding Lucky Minerals’ 
exploration license.  
 
33 Ravalli County Fish and Game Ass’n, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of State Lands, 
903 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Mont. 1995) (internal citation omitted). 
34 Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Dept. of Environmental Quality, 197 
P.3d 482, 488 (Mont. 2008). 
